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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ALLIANCE UNCERTAINTIES AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE PACIFIC: 
THE UNITED STATES’ AMBIGUOUS SECURITY COMMITMENTS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES 
 
By  
 
SISTOSO, Manuel Jeffrey Ordaniel  
 
 
 
The September 2010 Pinnacle Islands incident and the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal 
standoff highlighted Japan and the Philippines’ increasing doubts on the security that their 
respective alliances with the United States provide. It is necessary to identify how such 
uncertainties affected both countries’ policies in response to their separate disputes with a 
more assertive China. This paper assumes that the uncertainties perceived by Japan and the 
Philippines on their respective alliances with the United States have two expected 
implications: 1) Significant military buildup and increased defense postures; and 2) 
Diplomatic and security alliance building in the region. Additionally, this paper is also 
interested in identifying how the two countries view multilateral security and legal 
institutions in relation to their dispute with China and their alliance uncertainties toward their 
common ally, the United States.  
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
China is involved in various territorial and maritime disputes with its neighbors. Many of 
these disputes were largely set-aside1 during most of the course of China’s rapid economic 
development that started in the 1970s. The country’s emergence as the world’s second largest 
economy, its ever increasing need for more resources, particularly oil and gas, and its 
increased political clout in the international stage are all possible reasons why, at the turn of 
the 21st Century’s first decade, Beijing turned to become more aggressive in its maritime and 
territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. These disputes are becoming increasingly 
critical international political matters primarily because the maritime boundaries involved are 
located in the world’s fastest growing economic region with the potential of disrupting the 
still fragile global economic recovery. Moreover, the disputes involved areas that are not only 
rich in oil, gas and fishery resources2, they are also among the world’s busiest shipping lanes, 
raising stakes even higher.  
 
Two of the countries that China has disputes with are United States treaty-allies, Japan and 
the Philippines. This is significant in a sense that it could potentially involve Washington 
while at the same time provide lessons for other US allies in East Asia (e.g. South Korea, 
Taiwan) in dealing with their own China-related security issues. It is to be noted that the 
Obama Administration has already altered its foreign policy approach in 2011 and called it a 
“pivot to Asia,”3 signaling increased presence in this part of the world.  
 
                                                          
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, Set aside dispute and pursue joint development, 17 November 
2000, accessed 2 May 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18023.htm.   
2 Emmers, Ralf, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia, London: Routledge 2010 
 
3 Tom Donilo, America is Back in the Pacific and will Uphold the Rules, Financial Times, November 27, 2011. 
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The dispute between Japan and China involves maritime boundaries, as well as the 
sovereignty over the Pinnacle Islands4, known in Chinese as Diaoyu and in Japanese as 
Senkaku.  
 
The dispute between China and the Philippines mainly involves maritime boundaries, islets, 
rocks, shoals and other territories in the South China Sea, particularly the Spratly Islands, 
which are also claimed as a whole or in part by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan5. This 
paper, however, focuses on the immediate policy implications of the 2012 events in the 
Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island in Chinese and Panatag Shoal in Filipino), claimed 
only by Beijing and Manila and does not belong to the Spratly Group of Islands.  
 
The United States’ position is officially neutral when matters of control and ultimate 
sovereignty over territories and maritime domains in the East and South China Seas are 
concerned6. The US has been vocal in expressing its desire for countries involved to resolve 
the matters peacefully through collaborative efforts considering international law, as well as 
for the maintenance of unimpeded lawful commerce and freedom of navigation7.  
 
Japan and the Philippines are major non-NATO treaty allies of Washington. Both countries 
have expressed in the past their belief that the United States has an obligation to defend their 
forces if attacked in the territories or waters they dispute with China8. However, despite their 
treaties with the US, in matters of security, Washington is ambiguous. The ambiguity of 
American commitments to the security of its allies against possible Chinese assertiveness is 
                                                          
4 In order to adopt a neutral stance, this research used the international name of the islands instead of the more popular 
Chinese or Japanese names.  
5 Saleem, Omar. The Spratly Islands Dispute: China Defines the New Millennium. American University International Law 
Review 15, no. 3 (2000): 536-542. 
6 O'Rourke, Ronald. Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress. 
Washington D.C.. UNT Digital Library. http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc122273/. Accessed December 29, 
2012. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Tokyo Shimbun (13 December 1996, Morning Edition, p. 2; Business World (Manila, 13 December 1996), both found in US 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia (17 December 1996). 
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significant because it creates alliance uncertainties on the part of Japanese and Filipino 
leaders and policymakers. These alliance uncertainties could have wider implications in 
shaping Japanese and Philippine foreign policies, which in turn could significantly impact 
regional order and stability. This paper’s goal is to identify these policy implications 
considering that Tokyo and Manila are facing similar circumstances against a powerful and 
rising Beijing. Moreover, it is noteworthy to examine the responses of these two countries 
given their varying economic development stage, military capabilities and international 
political standing.  
 
1.1 Background 
 
Japan and the Philippines, both sharing maritime boundaries with China, have over 5-decade 
long mutual defense treaties with the United States. Both countries are archipelagic in nature 
and the differences in their land areas and populations are not that significant. They also share 
the United States’ ideals on freedom, human rights, democracy and free market.  
 
But there are also stark differences between the two that should be taken into account in 
evaluating how they confront a common challenge. On the one hand, Japan is a developed 
Northeast Asian island country with an advanced economy, though barely growing. It has one 
of the most sophisticated and technologically equipped maritime forces in the East Asian 
region9. On the other hand, the Philippines is a developing Southeast Asian island nation with 
an emerging, newly industrialized economy. Despite starting to become one of the fastest 
growing major economies in the World 10 , it is arguably the weakest major non-NATO 
military ally of the United States11. It is therefore important to identify how Washington’s 
                                                          
9 Samuels, Richard J.  Securing Japan : Tokyo's grand strategy and the future of East Asia / Richard J. Samuels  Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca :  2007  <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0713/2007010999.html> 
10 Ward, Karen. The World in 2050: From Top 30 to the Top 100. Rep. HSBC Research, 11 Jan. 2012. Web. 22 July 2012. 
<http://www.hsbc.com.mx/1/PA_esf-ca-app-content/content/home/empresas/archivos/world_2050.pdf>. 
11 De Castro, Renato C., and Walter Lohman. Getting the Philippines Air Force Flying Again: The Role of the U.S.–Philippines 
Alliance. Rep. The Heritage Foundation, 24 Sept. 2012. Web. 20 Oct. 2012. 
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position of neutrality on sovereignty issue, and ambiguity on security issue, play out in the 
two countries’ respective foreign policies and defense strategies on their disputes as the 
tensions in the South and East China Seas continue to unfold. 
 
1.2 Alliance Uncertainties and Policy Implications 
 
The incidents involving the Pinnacle Islands since September 2010 and the Scarborough 
Shoal since April 2012 obviously demonstrate that the national interests of these two Pacific 
countries are facing a direct and apparent threat from China. What those incidents further 
highlighted, that this paper wanted to focus on, was Washington’s ambiguous security 
commitments to its Pacific allies and how this ambiguity impacted Japanese and Philippine 
policies.  
 
The alliance uncertainties brought about by the United States’ ambiguous security stances 
should have pushed Japan and the Philippines to become more aggressive themselves in 
finding alternative ways of balancing China and safeguarding their interests moving forward. 
In theory, countries that feel threatened by a more powerful neighbor would usually resort to 
balancing through alliance building12, as well as through military build up13 and increased 
defense postures. In that context, this paper asserts that, from 2010, the two policy 
implications of the Philippines and Japan’s uncertainties over their respective alliances with 
the United States are: 1) Significant military buildup and increased defense postures; and 2) 
Diplomatic and security alliance building in the region. Moreover, it is interesting to identify 
how the two countries view multilateral security and legal institutions in relation to their 
separate disputes with China.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/getting-the-philippines-air-force-flying-again-the-role-of-the-us-
philippines-alliance>. 
12 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Theory of International Relations” (Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1979): 118 
13 Waltz, “Theory of International Relations,” 168 
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This paper argues that those two common policy actions of Japan and the Philippines from 
2010 were not only the results of an increasing Chinese assertiveness but also due to the 
United States’ ambiguous security commitments. Moreover, Washington’s seemingly lack of 
desire to confront China, in one way or another adds to the alliance uncertainties of Japan and 
the Philippines toward the Americans.  
 
This paper contains five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction that provides a short 
background of the issues involved, as well as the goals and justifications for the relevance of 
the research. The second chapter discusses the Pinnacle Islands and Scarborough Shoal 
disputes, respectively by providing details on each country’s claims. The third chapter 
discusses how the September 2010 Pinnacle Islands incident and the April 2012 Scarborough 
Shoal standoff underscored America’s ambiguous security commitments to both Japan and 
the Philippines. Moreover, the third chapter also discusses the causes of alliance uncertainties 
on the part of Tokyo and Manila toward Washington. The fourth chapter contains the 
implications of the alliance uncertainties to the foreign and defense policies of Tokyo and 
Manila. The last chapter concludes this paper.  
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CHAPTER II. THE DISPUTES 
 
 
The incidents involving the Pinnacle Islands since September 201014 and the Scarborough 
Shoal since April 201215 best describe the growing tensions in the East Asian Region over 
maritime and territorial conflicts. Those incidents highlight the United States’ ambiguous 
security commitments and corresponding changes in the Philippine and Japanese foreign 
policies.  
 
2.1 Pinnacle Islands and the Japan-China Dispute 
 
There is a long standing distrust16 between the world’s second and third largest economies 
and it has been most highlighted by their sovereignty dispute over a group of uninhabited 
islands known in Japan as Senkaku and in China as Diaoyu. This dispute is both territorial 
and maritime involving questions of international law on discovery, jurisdiction and 
occupation17 as well as political factors driven mainly by the Chinese-Japanese rivalry and 
the quest for control of resources and shipping lanes.  
 
The Pinnacle Islands, currently controlled by Japan, are located in the East China Sea. The 
island group is composed of five uninhabited islands and three rocky formations with a 
combined surface area of only 6.3 square kilometers18. Its largest island known as Diaoyudao 
in Chinese and Uotsuri in Japanese has a surface area of 3.6 square kilometers or more than 
                                                          
14 Gupta, Sourabh. "China-Japan Trawler Incident: Reviewing the Dispute over Senkaku/Daioyu Waters | East Asia Forum." 
East Asia Forum. N.p., 6 Dec. 2010. Web. 5 June 2012. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/06/china-japan-trawler-
incident-review-of-legalities-understandings-and-practices-in-disputed-senkakudaioyu-waters/>. 
15 Thayer, Carlyle A. "Standoff in the South China Sea." Standoff In The South China Sea. Yale Global Online, 12 June 2012. 
Web. 15 Aug. 2012. <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/standoff-south-china-sea>. 
16 Rozman, Gilbert.  Northeast Asia's stunted regionalism : bilateral distrust in the shadow of Globalization / Gilbert 
Rozman  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge [England] ; New 
York :  2004  <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam041/2003065354.html> 
17 The territorial (Pinnacle Islands) and maritime (borders and EEZ) disputes between China and Japan in the East China Sea 
have been studied and reviewed in various scholarly venues. Historical background and geographic facts can be found in: 
“Continental Shelf Issues in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea.” Occasional Paper, No. 15, Law of the Sea Institute, 
University of Rhode Island (1972); Choon-ho Park, East Asia and the Law of the Sea (National University Press, Seoul, 1983); 
and J Greenfield, China’s Practice in the Law of the Sea (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992); 
18 The equivalent would be 2.2 square miles or 1.4 acres 
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half of the entire island group. Their exact coordinates when pointed on a map extends from 
25°40’ to 26°00’ north and 123°25’ to 123°45’ east19.  
 
These basic geographic information form part of the Chinese and Taiwanese arguments. This 
research views the claims of both Beijing and Taipei as too similar.  Both the People’s 
Republic of China and the Republic of China/Taiwan agree that the Pinnacle islands are part 
of the Toucheng Town, Yilan County in Taiwan Island 20 . The Chinese arguments are 
centered on four basic premises: discovery, history, geography and treaty21.  
 
Beijing seems to be using its country’s thousands of years of recorded history to assert its 
sovereignty claims over territories in both South and East China Seas. The Chinese claim on 
Pinnacle Islands dates back to the 15th century when it was first mentioned in a document that 
is now kept by Oxford’s Bodleian Library in the United Kingdom22. China therefore asserts 
that since it discovered the islands in the 1400s, specifically 480 years earlier than the 
Japanese did and that it was the first to name them mean that they belong to China. Moreover, 
17th century Chinese documents also specifically described the boundary that separates the 
Pinnacle Islands from the Ryukyu Kingdom, further cementing Beijing’s historical argument. 
The boundary was termed as Heishuigou in Chinese or Black Water Trench, an area of high 
turbulence that corresponds to the dividing deep sea trench known currently as the Okinawa 
Trough.  
 
                                                          
19 Tao Cheng,”The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of 
Territorial Acquisition”, Vol. 14 V.J.I.L. (1973), 221 
20 Daniel Dzurek, The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute, http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/resources/docs/senkaku.html, accessed 
on July 15th, 2012 
21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. September 26, 2012. “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China.” 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ zxxx/t973774.htm 
22 United Kingdom. Parliament. Parliament.uk. By Jon Lunn. N.p., 20 Nov. 2012. Web. 29 Dec. 2012. 
<http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06475.pdf>. 
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The Ryukyu Kingdom was listed in 17th century Japanese sources as a separate nation and 
was annexed by Japan only in the 19th century upon its extinction23. 
 
Moreover, Beijing is also pointing back to 1720, the year when the travelogue, Zhongshan 
Chuanxin Lu or translated in English as Record of the Mission to Chusan, was compiled by 
Chinese envoy named Xu Baoguang who also conferred a royal title to the king of the 
Ryukyu Kingdom at that time24. The same Chinese envoy identified the deep sea trench as 
the boundary that separates China from the Ryukyu Kingdom. Beijing also mentioned the 
name of Hayashi Shihei, a Japanese geographer to strengthen its claim. Shihei drew a map in 
1785 in which he used Chinese names for the Pinnacle Islands, and described them as 
Chinese territories. 
 
Those are just a few of the many other “discovery” and historical bases, like ancient Chinese 
navigational records and maps that Beijing believes could withstand thorough academic 
scrutiny.  
 
Furthermore, China also believes that its claim can withstand geographic and legal challenges.  
 
The Pinnacle Islands are located nearest to the main island of Taiwan, which is roughly 
around 120 nautical miles25. Given such proximity, Pinnacle islands are actually well within 
the Taiwanese continental shelf. The islands are both 200 nautical miles eastward from the 
Chinese mainland and southeast of Okinawa 26. Furthermore, the maximum depth of the 
seawater that separates the islands from both Taiwan and mainland China is only 200 
                                                          
23 Kerr, George H.  Okinawa, the history of an island people / by George H. Kerr  C. E. Tuttle Co., Rutland, Vt. :  1958 
24 Encyclopédie Moderne, 6 (1825) 549 (new ed., vol. 9, col. 120) 
25 Shaw, Han-yi. (1999). The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the 
P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan. Baltimore, Maryland: University of Maryland School of Law. OCLC 608151745 
26 Ibid. 
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meters27. By contrast, a deep sea trench separates the Pinnacle from Okinawa Islands with a 
depth of 2,270 meters28, a fact that matches China’s historical records.  
 
Beijing also insists that the Pinnacle Islands have been under Chinese administration even 
before 1895, the year when the Japanese allegedly started to exercise effective control over 
the islands. Beijing wants to weaken Tokyo’s argument, which concludes that prior to 1895, 
the territory was terra nullius or not owned or controlled by any state. For instance, the 
document called Shi Liuqiu Lu or the Record of the Imperial Envoy to Ryukyu written by a 
Ming Dynasty imperial ambassador, in 1534 mentioned that the Pinnacle Islands were not 
part of the Ryukyu Kingdom29. Various Chinese records also mentioned that the islands were 
part of China's coastal defense system,30 which could be interpreted in the present day as 
active control and occupation.  Moreover, Beijing also insists that their fishermen had been 
using the Pinnacle islands and its surrounding waters devoid of any interruption until 197031. 
From the Chinese perspective, the islands may be uninhabited but it does not mean 
unoccupied and therefore not “terra nullius” when the Japanese found them in 1895.  
 
China also argued that its claim is grounded on international treaties. For instance, the 1943 
Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Postdam Declaration, both accepted by Japan upon its 
surrender, mandated that Tokyo should return the territories China had ceded. China believes 
it should include the Pinnacle Islands. It is to be noted that Taiwan was ceded to Japan under 
the terms of the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty that formally ended the first Sino-Japanese War of 
                                                          
27 The Times - Atlas of the world. London, John Bartholomew & Son 7th edition, 1985. 
28 Han-yi Shaw, ”Its History and an analysis of the ownership Claims of The P.R.C., R.O.C. and Japan”, No. 3 Occasional 
Papers 1999, 96 
29 Y. Zhong 'Lum diaoyudao zhuquan de guishu (On the Soverighty of the Diaoyu Islands)' People's Daily(Beijing 18 Oc. 
1996). 
30 U. Suganuma. Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands (Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, HI. 2000), pp. 61-68. 
31 The Boston Action Committee to Defend Tiao-Yu-T'ai (the Diaoyu Islands) as Chinese Territory, Taio-Yu-T'ai Islands: A 
Legal Analysis, April 10, 1971, pp. 2-3. 
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1894-95. Since the Pinnacle Islands are part of Taiwan, the Chinese believes that it should be 
out of Japanese control as compliance to both the Cairo and Postdam Declarations. 
 
Despite the seemingly strong historical evidences that China has been presenting to 
strengthen its claim, Japan is not backing off and is also forming its own logic to support the 
current status quo, which puts the Pinnacle Islands under Tokyo’s sovereignty. The islands 
are currently under Ishigaki, a city of the Okinawa Prefecture. The Japanese claim centers on 
three simplistic arguments. They are discovery and occupation, active control, and treaty32.  
 
Japan insists that its fisherman, Tatsushiro Koga, discovered the Pinnacle Islands in 1884 and 
that they were terra nullius at that time33. The following year, the Japanese Government 
allegedly conducted field surveys in the area to confirm any trace of control or ownership by 
other state. They found no trace of Chinese control and 10 years later decided to establish a 
marker signaling its official incorporation to the Japanese territory34.  
 
The decision to put a marker on January 14, 1895 started the official effective occupation of 
Japan over Pinnacle Islands and that continued until 1951 when effective administration was 
transferred to the United States as compliance to the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed by 
Tokyo and the Allied Powers. Japan's position also stressed that sovereignty over the 
Pinnacle Islands were not renounced by agreeing to that treaty. Furthermore, the Okinawa 
Reversion Treaty returned back to Japan the administration of the islands from the United 
States.  
 
                                                          
32 Lee, Seokwoo. 2002. Territorial disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan concerning the Senkaku islands. Boundary and 
territory briefing 3 (7): 1-8. 
33 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands.” The full text can be 
found at www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/senkaku.html 
34 Y. Matsui. 'Legal Bases and Analysis of Japan's Claims to the Senkaku Islands' in K.H.C. Chiu (ed.) International Law 
Conference on Dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Taiwan Law Society and Taiwan Institute of International Law, Taipei 
1997), pp. 32-45. 
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Japan is also pointing out China's failure to express any objection against US control of the 
islands as stipulated in the Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Tokyo insists that the 
decision of both Beijing and Taipei not to object during the entire duration of US 
administration over the islands indicated that China did not actually consider the Pinnacle 
Islands as part of Taiwan35.  
 
Although the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Seas provides mechanisms by 
which a maritime dispute can be tried and decided, it does not cover sovereignty issue over 
islands or land masses in the world’s oceans and seas36. The historical rivalry between China 
and Japan was highlighted as the level of nationalism in both countries significantly increased 
every time their diplomatic row over the Pinnacle Islands erupts37. Beijing and Tokyo must 
have felt growing domestic pressures to stand firm on their respective claims.  
 
September 2010 Incident 
 
The tension in 2010 started when Zhan Qixiong, captain of the Chinese fishing trawler 
Minjinyu 5179 collided his vessel against Japan’s coastguard ships in the waters surrounding 
Pinnacle Islands on the morning of September 7th of that year38. For the Chinese, the fishing 
vessel was legally operating in the waters that belong to China. For the Japanese, the trawler 
intentionally rammed itself into Japanese law enforcement vessels in an area that is under 
Tokyo’s sovereignty and therefore the captain had to be arrested and prosecuted. Diplomatic 
row instantaneously erupted, as Beijing demanded the immediate release of Zhan Qixiong 
and his fishing trawler. Tokyo initially held firm on its position that the issue is not a matter 
                                                          
35 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands.” The full text can be 
found at www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/senkaku.html 
36 "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 20 Jan. 2013. 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm>. 
37 Smith, Sheila. "Japan, China, and the Tide of Nationalism." Council on Foreign Relations. N.p., 19 Sept. 2012. Web. 19 
Nov. 2012. <http://www.cfr.org/asia/japan-china-tide-nationalism/p29080>. 
38 Hagström Linus,(2012) 'Power Shift' in East Asia? A Critical Reappraisal of Narratives on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
Incident in 2010, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 2012 5: 267-297. 
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of territorial dispute39 and that the captain involved was arrested and being prosecuted for 
violating Japanese law only to release him a few days later.   
 
The tension resulted to other succeeding events that cornered the United States. The US 
position was neutral on which country has the ultimate sovereignty over Pinnacle Islands40 
and yet Washington has stated that it will stand by its security treaty with Tokyo41. It is 
however unclear if the United States can risk a confrontation with China over Pinnacle 
Islands when it does not even have a position on which country has the rightful sovereignty 
over them.  
 
2.2 Scarborough Shoal and Philippines-China Dispute 
 
The dispute between the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China involve various 
territories in the South China Sea. The Scarborough Shoal however is standing out because 
the dispute is bilateral in nature and that the standoff between a Philippine naval ship and 
China’s Marine Surveillance vessels in April 2012 highlighted Beijing’s increased 
aggressiveness in asserting its sovereignty over the islands, shoals, rocks and waters within 
its 9-dash line map that basically claims the entire South China Sea42. It is to be noted that the 
Philippines have conducted similar arrests of Chinese fishermen in the past, in waters that are 
within the country’s 200 nautical mile-exclusive economic zones43 and it was only in April 
2012 that China resorted to actively blocking an arrest resulting to a standoff.  
 
                                                          
39 Kubota, Yoko, and Chris Buckley. "Japan Refuses China Demand for Apology in Boat Row." Reuters. N.p., 25 Sept. 2010. 
Web. 20 Sept. 2012. <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/09/25/uk-japan-china-idUKTRE68N09H20100925>. 
40 "Japan/China." Daily Press Briefing. Proc. of Daily Press Briefing, Washington DC. US Department of State, 29 Oct. 2010. 
Web. 11 July 2012. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/147836.htm>. 
41 Ibid. 
42 LI Jinming & LI Dexia, “The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note”, 34 Ocean Development and 
International Law (2003). 287-195 
43 "Phl and China Seek Diplomatic Solution on Scarborough Issue." PIA. Philippine Information Agency, 26 Apr. 2012. Web. 
20 June 2012. <http://www.pia.gov.ph/news/index.php?article=2271335414573>. 
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Scarborough Shoal, known in Filipino as Panatag Shoal and in Chinese as Huangyan Island, 
is a 150 square kilometer triangular-shaped group of rocks, islets and reefs. It is 124 nautical 
miles west of the main Philippine island of Luzon, in the South China Sea44. When pointed 
on a map, the shoal is located 15°07′ north and 117°51′ east. The area is dominated by a 
lagoon measuring 130 square kilometers and 10-20 meters deep. The area is abundant of 
fishery resources.  
 
China claims almost the entire South China Sea as it insists its 9-dash line map based on 
historical accounts. The Scarborough Shoal falls within that 9-dash line map even if it is 
actually more than 600 kilometers away from the nearest main Chinese landmass45.  
 
China insists that it has a stronger historical footing to claim the Scarborough Shoal. Its 
historical records show that Chinese astronomer Guo Shoujing was tasked by the Chinese 
Government then under the Yuan Dynasty in 1279 to survey the “four seas.” The expedition, 
according to the Chinese, led him to the discovery of the Scarborough Shoal. Chinese 
geography scholar Han Zhenhua in 1979 specified in that particular survey that the area 
called Nanhai is the present day Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese Government, however 
contradicted such, in 1980 at the height of its dispute with Vietnam, stating instead the 
Nanhai in the historical record was located in the Paracels. Other Chinese scholars believe 
that the Nanhai does not refer to the present day Scarborough Shoal such as Zeng Zhaoxuan 
who believes that Nanshi is actually in Central Vietnam. Nevertheless, the Chinese 
Government insists that it was the first country to discover Scarborough and gave it a name.  
 
In 1935, the Lands and Waters Mapping Review Committee of the then sitting Chinese 
Government approved and published the names of the islands, reefs, shoals and sand bars in 
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the South China Sea 46 totaling 132. The Scarborough Shoal was included. In 1947, the 
Chinese Government increased that number to 172, again including the Scarborough Shoal 
under the name, Minzhu Jiao. In 1983, the Chinese Government, under the Communists 
changed the name to Huangyan Island. In 1992, it passed a law that claims all the islands, 
reefs and shoals located inside a u-shaped line in the South China Sea as part of its territory, 
including the Scarborough Shoal. 
 
China also believes that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
cannot be used as the basis for determining which country has the right to claim the 
Scarborough Shoal. In an official expository statement47 published in the official website of 
the Chinese Embassy in Manila, China stressed that under international law, “the land 
dominates the sea” and that coastal states obtain their sovereign rights and jurisdiction over 
exclusive economic zones from their territorial sovereignty alleging that UNCLOS cannot 
solve sovereignty questions. Under this logic, China is considering the Scarborough Shoal as 
a "land" and that it has sovereignty over it and should not be included in the Philippines’ 
exclusive economic zone under international law, particularly UNCLOS. It would mean 
however that the Scarborough Shoal should also have its own 200 nautical mile- exclusive 
economic zone, something that many international law experts disagree with.  
 
The Philippines’ bases for claiming the Scarborough Shoal involve three main premises: 
historical records, active jurisdiction and international law48.  
 
Manila's historical basis relies heavily on one of the earliest and most accurate Philippine 
maps printed in 1734 by Spanish Jesuit priest Pedro Murillo Velarde 49. The 1734 map 
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<http://www.gov.ph/2012/04/18/philippine-position-on-bajo-de-masinloc-and-the-waters-within-its-vicinity/>. 
15 
 
identified the Scarborough Shoal as Bajo de Masinloc, part of Masinloc Municipality, 
Zambales Province in the Philippines.  
 
The name Bajo de Masinloc, given by Spanish Colonizers, literally means "under Masinloc 
Town". There were other maps printed by the Spaniards that included the Scarborough Shoal 
as part of the territory of its then sole colony in Asia.  
 
Manila is also insisting that since its independence, it has exercised effective occupation and 
jurisdiction over Scarborough Shoal50, something that China allegedly did not. In its official 
position paper, the Philippines mentioned the installation of Philippine flags in 1965 and 
1997, the establishment of a lighthouse in one of the islets in 1965 and its subsequent repair 
in 2009, its use for defense purposes and its classification as a regime of islands under 
Philippine law known as Archipelagic Baseline Law that adheres to the United Nations 
Convention on the Laws of the Sea51, as strong evidences of both effective occupation and 
jurisdiction.  
 
The Philippines claims sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal and the waters that surround 
it. Its position paper clarified that the country's basis for claiming the shoal was public 
international law particularly effective occupation and jurisdiction and not merely on its close 
proximity to main Philippine islands nor its location being within the UNCLOS-mandated 
EEZ. It stated the Palmas Island Case, which was historically discovered by Spain. Its 
sovereignty eventually was given to the Netherlands by an international court on the basis of 
“effective exercise of jurisdiction.” 
 
The paper further stated that China’s repeated statement on the Scarborough Shoal being a 
traditional fishing ground of the Chinese for centuries does not suffice. The Philippines 
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insists that "the act of fishing by Chinese fishermen" is not a sovereign act by a state and it 
does not “display state authority.” 
 
“For occupation to be effective there has to be clear demonstration of the intention and will of 
a state to act as sovereign and there has to be peaceful and continuous display of state 
authority, which the Philippines has consistently demonstrated,” the Philippines' Department 
of Foreign Affairs claims52.  
 
In summary, the Philippines’ claim over Scarborough Shoal’s rocks and islets is a claim over 
land based on customary law while its claim over the surrounding waters is based on 
UNCLOS. Under UNCLOS’ Article 121 paragraph 3, “rocks which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental 
shelf.” Rocks are not entitled to have exclusive economic zones, only 12 nautical miles of 
territorial waters. Since the Philippines is claiming the rocks based on customary law and the 
waters around it based on UNCLOS, the Southeast Asian country believes it has the 
sovereignty over both the rocks’ 12 nautical miles territorial waters and the rest of the waters 
around the shoal that are well within the Philippines’ 200- nautical mile exclusive economic 
zone.  
 
April 2012 Incident53 
 
The Scarborough Shoal dispute between the two neighbors was highlighted by a standoff 
between the Philippines' navy and coastguard ships and Chinese government law 
enforcement vessels that started in the morning of April 10, 2012.  
 
Two days prior, a Philippine surveillance plane confirmed the presence of 8 Chinese fishing 
boats in the Scarborough Shoal. The Philippine Navy immediately deployed its BRP 
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Gregorio De Pilar, a US-made cutter based in Palawan Province to patrol the Scarborough 
Shoal. As it is a huge ship incapable of traversing shallow waters, it dispatched a boarding 
team to inspect the Chinese fishing vessels and collect photos inside the shoal. The Philippine 
Navy later on reported that the first fishing vessel that was boarded contained corals, giant 
clams and live sharks, most of them listed internationally as endangered species.  
 
As the arrest was imminent, two Chinese maritime surveillance ships identified as Zhonggou 
Haijian 75 and Zhonggou Haijian 84 sailed to the area and placed themselves in the middle of 
the Chinese fishing vessels and the Philippine Navy ship, triggering a standoff. No Chinese 
fishermen were arrested and they were later on allowed to leave the area along with their 
catch.  
 
The scenario was the first time that the Philippines actually failed to arrest Chinese fishermen 
in its exclusive economic zone, a significant sign that can be interpreted as an attempt by 
China to revise the status quo in the South China Sea.  
 
The standoff resulted to increased nationalism in both China and the Philippines54. Chinese 
state owned media were quick to react and the Scarborough Shoal dispute dominated their 
timeslots and editorial pages, including threats of war. In the Philippines, there was a pressure 
from legislators to push the United States to clarify its position on the status of its Mutual 
Defense treaty on whether or not Washington will aid Manila in case of war with Beijing55. 
Some politicians called for constitutional revisions that will allow the Philippines to prioritize 
defense spending56 and to a certain extent host foreign military bases once again. Filipinos 
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held rallies in front of the Chinese Embassy in Manila and there was a global effort calling 
Filipinos worldwide to protest against Chinese bullying on the same day, prompting the 
government of China to issue a warning to its citizens in the Philippines to remain indoor on 
that day or just leave the archipelago. Chinese and Filipino hackers also joined the tensed 
situation. Chinese hackers were the first to deface Philippine websites but Filipino hackers 
were quick to react and did the same.  
 
On June 15, 2012, citing bad weather and after getting prior commitments from China 
through their diplomatic channels of an imminent pullout of all Chinese government vessels 
from the area, the Philippines pulled out all its ships.57  
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CHAPTER III. DEFENSE PACTS, US RESPONSES AND  
ALLIANCE UNCERTAINTIES 
3.1 Defense Pacts 
 
The United States has defense treaty alliances with both Japan and the Philippines. Those 
treaties were useful during the height of the Cold War as they became among the 
cornerstones of the United States’ battle against the spread of communism. The incidents that 
occurred in the Pinnacle Islands and the Scarborough Shoal since 2010 put into question the 
relevance of those mutual defense treaties given the realities of the present.  
 
3.1.1 US-Japan Alliance 
 
The US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty 58 , formally known as the “Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America” was signed on 
the 19th of January 1960. It contains ten articles. The treaty originated from the earlier 
"Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan" signed in 1951 that largely focused on 
the United States' commitment to the full defense of Japan by stationing military bases in the 
northeast Asian archipelago to deter external armed attack as the country was reorganizing 
itself from the ravages of the Second World War. The 1960 treaty is more comprehensive 
involving not just defense but also economic and other matters related to international 
cooperation.  
 
Relevant to this research is the Article V of the treaty, which states:  
 
"Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories 
under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety 
and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its 
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constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures 
taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the 
United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such 
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures 
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security." 
 
It is to be noted that although the United States does not take sides on the sovereignty 
questions involving the Pinnacle Islands59, the fact that the territory in question is under the 
“administration” of Japan bounds the United States to fulfill its treaty obligations. Moreover, 
China, like the United States is a veto-wielding member of the United Nations Security 
Council. A stalemate in the Security Council due to an effective veto from any of its five 
permanent members can prevent the Council from taking measures “necessary to restore and 
maintain international peace and security,” which in this case involves the Pinnacle Islands, 
the East China Sea and the Northeast Asian region, at large.  
 
3.1.2 US-Philippines Alliance 
 
The US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, composed of 8 articles was signed on the 30th of 
August 1951 and from then up to the present has never undergone revisions or amendments. 
It is to be noted that the Military Bases Agreement that was unilaterally terminated by Manila 
upon its expiration in 1991 was a separate treaty. The US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty 
was signed only five years after Washington enacted a law that granted the Southeast Asian 
Archipelago its full independence.  
 
Relevant to this research are articles IV and V. Article IV says:  
 
“Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the 
Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act 
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to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any 
such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be 
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore 
and maintain international peace and security.” 
 
Article V specified the preceding article as:  
 
“For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed 
to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, 
or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed 
forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.” 
 
Although the Scarborough Shoal is not considered as an island, much less so as a 
metropolitan territory, an attack on Manila-controlled vessels or aircrafts bounds the United 
States to come to the defense of the Philippines. It is to be noted that the South China Sea is 
geographically part of the Pacific, aside from previous official diplomatic exchanges between 
Manila and Washington that confirmed that an armed attack on any Philippine public vessels 
is covered by the treaty60.  
 
As mentioned previously in this research, China’s veto-wielding membership in the UN 
Security Council can potentially prevent the United States from suspending any immediate 
measure taken to the defense of the Philippines, in principle, which could dissuade it from 
taking an extreme measure such as a military intervention, in the first place.  
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3.2 Defense Pact Implications and Alliance Uncertainties 
 
One interpretation of the texts of those treaties would mean that the United States must come 
to the defense of Tokyo and Manila should Beijing’s increased aggressiveness results to the 
use of force. Another interpretation is that, the US treaties with Tokyo and Manila contain no 
precise military commitments. The second interpretation results to alliance uncertainties 
given the United States’ perceived economic decline and economic dependence on China.  
 
Both the Japan-US and the Philippines-US alliance systems provide that each party will “act 
to meet the danger… in accordance with [their] constitutional processes.” Such phrase does 
not entail specific security commitments. Moreover, it does not mention precise course of 
action to which the United States commit itself if Japan and the Philippines are attacked. Both 
treaties only prescribe “consultations” between the parties if any situation in which their 
treaties are to become operational. It leaves a huge flexibility for leaders and policymakers in 
Washington to decide which course of action to pursue once Japan or the Philippines invoke 
their treaties. While the United States continues to stress that it would honor its treaty 
commitments to both Japan and the Philippines, it does not want to discuss hypothetical 
scenarios making its security commitments to both countries even more doubtful, especially 
that it also wants to emphasize its neutral stance to most China-related territorial disputes.  
 
Moreover, the United States’ responses to the 2010 Pinnacle Islands incident and the 2012 
Scarborough Shoal standoff had been very tepid. Those responses were limited to reminding 
all countries concerned to adopt restraint and avoid the use of force.  
 
The 2010 Pinnacle Islands incident, which resulted in the release of the Chinese captain, was 
widely described by the media as “a concession that appeared to mark a humiliating retreat in 
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a Pacific test of wills.” 61  International Relations Professor Hiroshi Nakanishi of Kyoto 
University agreed, noting that Japan appeared to have given in to China's pressures. The New 
York Times concluded that Japan's decision to release the captain of the Chinese Trawler was, 
at that time, "the latest indicator of the shifting balance of power in Asia," noting that in the 
same year, China surpassed the size of Japan's economy. With all these, Washington’s 
response to Japan’s decision was revealing. The US State Department issued a statement 
saying that such was how “mature states resolve these things -- through diplomacy.”62 The 
US State Department’s response indicated that Washington’s top priority was the de-
escalation of conflict, even if it meant a diplomatic victory for Beijing and a defeat for its 
own treaty ally.  
 
Likewise, the United States largely avoided discussing anything specifics when the 
Philippines was in the midst of a diplomatic standoff with China63. Despite China’s apparent 
attempt to revise the status quo in the Scarborough Shoal, the United States was seemed more 
interested in seeing the conflict diffused. The Philippines unilaterally withdrew all its vessels 
from the shoal on June 15, 2012, six weeks after the 2-on-2 meeting between the defense and 
foreign secretaries of both countries in Washington.  
 
The tepid response of the United States to Japan’s diplomatic struggle with China in 2010 
indeed should have already caused alliance uncertainties. An analysis by Australian National 
University Professor of Strategic Studies Hugh White in his 2012 book, The China 
Choice:  Why America Should Share Power, clearly provided a strong case for such 
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uncertainties to actually exist. “Japan’s security, or lack thereof, is inextricably tied to 
‘America’s China Choice’. As long as Japan’s alliance with America remains the centerpiece 
of its strategic policy, it will depend almost completely on Washington to protect it from 
Chinese pressure.  The problem is that the more powerful China becomes, the less Japan can 
depend on the United States.” 64 Other scholars have noted that Japan already started to 
develop a perception of doubt when it comes to US commitments. “There is a perception in 
Japan that the U.S. commitment is ambiguous,” Yoichiro Sato, director of international 
strategic studies at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University in southern Japan told Time 
Magazine65. The very real possibility that Washington might prioritize its own China-related 
national interest by avoiding any military conflict with Beijing is not a surprising cause for 
Japan’s alliance uncertainties toward the US.  
For Manila, pronouncements from its leaders and policymakers at the height of its diplomatic 
ordeal with Beijing seem to suggest that the United States’ former colony has been 
increasingly doubtful of Washington’s commitments to fulfill its obligations. For instance, a 
senior member of the Philippine Senate was quoted as saying in response to the Scarborough 
Shoal standoff, “We are left to fend for ourselves. What happened to us? We’re like 
orphans…without allies. That’s our dilemma.”66 His remarks, which were echoed by many 
other policymakers in Manila, signified the Philippines’ doubts on US commitments. These 
doubts result to alliance uncertainties, which in turn pushed the country to diversify its 
security hedge against the rising China.  
Overall, the 2010 Pinnacle Islands incident and the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff 
underscored two important things that caused alliance uncertainties on the part of Tokyo and 
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Manila. First is the ambiguity of the United States’ security commitments to Japan and the 
Philippines brought about by the classification of the alliance and the text of the respective 
treaties, as well as the lack of clarifications from Washington. The second involve the 
relatively tepid responses of Washington to the incidents that occurred in the Pinnacle Islands 
in 2010 and the Scarborough Shoal in 2012, despite the clear increased assertiveness of 
Beijing.  
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CHAPTER IV. ALLIANCE UNCERTAINTIES AND IMPLICATIONS ON  
JAPANESE AND PHILIPPINE POLICIES 
 
Given that Japan and the Philippines have been increasingly doubtful of the alliance 
commitments of the United States, it is necessary to identify how such uncertainties affected 
both countries’ policies in response to their disputes with a more assertive China. 
 
This paper assumes that the uncertainties perceived by Japan and the Philippines on their 
respective alliances with the United States have two expected implications: 1) Significant 
military buildup and increased defense postures; and 2) Diplomatic and security alliance 
building in the region.  
 
First, existing literatures argue that significant military buildup and increased defense 
posturing come about when states face apparent threats67. It must be noted however, that the 
Japan-US and the Philippines-US alliances are unequal alliances. While the United States 
should be committed to defend Japan and the Philippines when they are attacked, Washington 
does not require Tokyo and Manila, as prescribed in their respective treaties, to come to the 
defense of the Americans in case of the same. It can be assumed that the United States 
willingly accepted its role as defenders of Japan and the Philippines when it signed a mutual 
defense treaty with them. This paper therefore argues that there should be no need for Tokyo 
and Manila to significantly alter the trend of their military buildup and defense postures if 
Washington’s security commitments were not doubtful. Because both Japan and the 
Philippines are having these alliance uncertainties toward the United States, one major 
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resulting policy implication of this should be a noticeable and significant military build up 
and increased defense posturing.  
 
Second, existing literatures also argue that, when states are dissatisfied with the factors (e.g. 
current military hardware) that guarantee their security and/or when they are in doubt of the 
reliability of the commitments of their security allies in the face of a threat, they resort to 
seeking alliances with other nations68.  
 
Additionally, this paper is also interested on how the two countries view multilateral security 
and legal institutions in relation to their dispute with China and their alliance uncertainties 
toward their common ally, the United States.  
  
To prove the first two assumptions, it is important to observe the corresponding policies of 
Tokyo and Manila that resulted from the September 2010 Pinnacle Islands incident and the 
April 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff.  
 
 
4.1 Significant military buildup and increased defense postures 
 
The policy pronouncements and intents of both Tokyo and Manila since the significant 
incidents happened in their claimed areas in the East and South China Seas, respectively, 
have been pointing to significant military build up and increased defense postures. This is the 
most obvious implication of the two countries’ alliance uncertainties toward the United States. 
While it could be argued that this action of both Tokyo and Manila in beefing up their own 
defenses was merely a reaction to a more apparent threat from China, it is not a sufficient 
reason. The “China threat” has been existing for both Japan and the Philippines even before 
the 2010 Pinnacle Islands incident and the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff. It was only after 
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those events that the two countries became extra aggressive in building up their defense 
capabilities. Considering their close coordination with their common treaty ally, Washington, 
and their domestic economic priorities, significant military build up could only come out of 
the United States’ ambiguous security commitments. If the two countries could simply rely 
on the United States for their defenses because of their respective treaties, military should not 
be on top of the priorities of policymakers in Tokyo and Manila. It must be considered that 
Tokyo is battling a chronic deflation and lack of respectable economic growth, not to mention 
its debt problems. Manila, though presiding over one of the fastest growing economies in the 
region and a financially sound government, could not possibly prioritize defense spending yet, 
over its domestic problems on poverty and infrastructures, if only the United States security 
commitment was clear.  
 
Japan 
 
Japan’s dramatic shift to the right in 2012 was significant. It signified Japan’s willingness to 
counter China head on. There are two significant events that signal Tokyo’s military build-up 
and increased defense posture resulting from its alliance uncertainties toward Washington. 
First is the increasing call for the revision of the country’s pacifist constitution that would 
allow a return to “normal” armed forces and collective defense. Second is the sudden increase 
in defense budget, which is a first in over a decade, and an increase in military personnel, a 
first in over four decades.  
 
Japan has a pacifist constitution. Its Article 9 disallows an act of war by the state69. It is 
significant because it legally prohibits Japan from settling international disputes through the 
use of force. It also bans Japan from providing collective defense to its allies.  
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The full text of the article in Japanese: 
 
第九条 日本国民は、正義と秩序を基調とする国際平和を誠実に希求し
、国権の発動たる戦争と、武力による威嚇又は武力の行使は、国際紛争
を解決する手段としては、永久にこれを放棄する。 
 
二 前項の目的を達するため、陸海空軍その他の戦力は、これを保持し
ない。国の交戦権は、これを認めない。 
 
 
Official English translation: 
 
ARTICLE 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and 
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 
(2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 
It must be noted that Japan’s pacifist constitution is one of the domestic justifications for the 
continued presence of US bases in the country. The commitment provided by the United 
States for Japan’s external defense was, for most of the last 60 years, unquestionable. In 2006, 
when Shinzo Abe first became Prime Minister, he proposed a constitutional revision, aiming 
specifically to alter Article 9 and normalize the country’s armed forces70. His efforts to revise 
the constitution failed due to lack of enthusiastic support from other Japanese policymakers. 
This would indicate that Japan was relatively still confident of Washington’s commitment to 
its security coupled with a still calm China. In 2006, China was only the fourth largest 
economy and the Deng Xiaoping era policy towards the Pinnacle Islands71 was still in effect 
– that was, not altering the status quo to promote harmonious relationship with Japan, but 
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without necessarily renouncing its sovereignty claim. Since everything changed in September 
2010, and as the United States continued to emphasize the engagement of China and the 
maintenance of peace and stability in East Asia, despite Beijing’s increased assertiveness, the 
calls for the revision of the country’s constitution became louder. While not the only reason, 
it could be one of the biggest factors that led the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan to sweep 
back into power, with Shinzo Abe regaining his post as Prime Minister. One of his campaign 
promises was to push for a stronger policy on the country’s various territorial disputes, 
including a revival of his previous proposal to revise Japan’s pacifist constitution72.  
 
It can be argued that Tokyo’s most important goal is to maintain the status quo on the 
Pinnacle Islands and prevent Beijing from revising that status quo. Should Beijing 
successfully capture the islands by military force or by short civilian law enforcement 
conflict, or through a naval standoff that could prevent Tokyo from enforcing Japanese 
domestic laws (Chinese Marine Surveillance vs Japanese Coast Guards), effectively 
establishing a new status quo, it is possible for the United States not to take action and instead 
merely urge dialogue, in the name of regional stability and avoid a direct war with China. As 
explained in the previous chapter, Washington may not see the same vested interest in 
keeping Tokyo in control of the Pinnacle Islands as it would in defending mainland Japan or 
in making sure that it does not confront China militarily given economic considerations. With 
a constitution preventing the Japanese government from employing war to settle international 
disputes, Tokyo would be in a potentially humiliating situation, unable to revise a possibly 
new status quo. Couple these doubts with an increasingly aggressive China, it is evident that 
these alliance uncertainties felt by the Japanese toward their partner, the Americans, is 
resulting to a higher possibility of constitutional revision. A defense posture that highlights 
this possibility could be a deterrent factor.  
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The same reason could be said for Japan’s apparent military build up. A few weeks after the 
September 2010 Pinnacle Islands incident, the Japanese Ministry of Defense announced its 
plan to expand the size the country’s self defense force personnel by 10 percent or at least 
13,000 troops by 201273. This is significant because it was the first time in almost 40 years 
that Tokyo wanted more self-defense force troops. The media described it as a policy that 
came “amid growing regional tensions, particularly in areas where China's navy is 
increasingly active.” 74  Again, if there were no alliance uncertainties, the US alliance 
commitment would have sufficed. Nevertheless, the Defense Ministry’s plan was put on hold 
for a time and revived when Abe came to power again.  
 
Furthermore, in January 2013, Tokyo announced an increase in its defense spending 75 . 
Months prior to this announcement, Chinese government vessels entered the waters around 
the Pinnacle Islands for several times and Chinese surveillance aircrafts entered the islands’ 
airspace for the first time, which prompted Tokyo to send in fighter jets76. This indicated a 
strong possibility of an armed conflict in the future. The United States’ only response was to 
remind China and Japan about the economic importance of their countries and that regional 
stability must be maintained. All of these developments would not have urged Japan to 
increase its defense posture or build up its military more aggressively than what it had been 
since the end of the cold war, if the United States’ commitment was not doubtful. Although 
the increase could be viewed as relatively small, such a move by Japanese policymakers was 
significant because of two reasons. First, it was the first time in over a decade that Tokyo 
wanted to increase its defense budget. Second, the primary target of Abe’s plans to beef up 
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the military was to increase Japan’s capability to defend its territories in the southern part of 
the country.  
 
Philippines 
 
Resulting significant military buildup and increased defense posture were more obvious on 
the part of Manila. While it could be argued that the Philippines’ move to drastically build up 
its military was simply a reaction to a more aggressive China, it would not be a sufficient 
reason. The more obvious factor that influenced Manila’s decision is its perceived uncertainty 
on Washington’s security commitments.  
While it could be argued that the increased Chinese aggressiveness in the Spratly islands 
since 2010 already pushed President Benigno Aquino III to consider beefing up the country’s 
defense, such a policy option even became more urgent as a result of the Scarborough Shoal 
standoff. As explained in the previous chapter, policymakers in Manila already felt 
uncertainties toward the country’s alliance with the US. Military build up and more 
aggressive defense posture became Manila’s most obvious response to Washington’s 
uncertain security commitments in the face of a more threatening China.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the United States’ reluctance to significantly boost 
Philippine defense needs added to the alliance uncertainty being felt by policymakers in 
Manila.  
By June 2012, two months after the Scarborough Shoal incident took place, the Philippine 
Senate started and later on approved a sweeping set of amendments to existing Armed Forces 
of the Philippines Modernization Act passed in 1996 after the Mischief Reef incident. The 
amendments were significant because it basically means an increased and rapid military build 
up for the Philippines. Under this new law, the Philippines’ defense department will have P75 
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billion (1.8 Billion USD) on its disposal for the first five years of hardware purchases. The 
law also extends the armed forces modernization program to another 15 years. Moreover, it 
exempts the Department of Defense from the requirement of public bidding when major 
defense purchases such as aircraft, vessels, tanks, armored vehicles, communications 
equipment and high powered firearms are concerned enabling the country to purchase 
necessary hardwares the soonest time possible.  
The media quoted the principal author of the new law, Senator Panfilo Lacson, during his bill 
sponsorship speech. “This matter [Scarborough Shoal] only serves to elucidate the 
importance of having a reliable military force. While we do not discount the importance of 
having allies, it is undeniable that our country must have a reliable military force that can 
readily protect and defend our territory, our natural resources, and most importantly, our 
people," Lacson said77.  
At the surface, Lacson’s words could be simplified to mean that the Philippines’ renewed 
commitment to defense modernization is a mere reaction to China’s aggressiveness. However, 
a deeper analysis would reveal another perspective. Lacson’s words actually represented 
Filipino policymakers’ decreased confidence over the United States’ security commitment to 
the Philippines. The Scarborough shoal incident apparently highlighted Washington’s 
ambiguous security commitments to Manila, thus the need for the Philippines to pursue a 
more ambitious military build up. It is to be noted that this military modernization law was 
originally enacted in reaction to China’s occupation of the Mischief Reef in 1995. It however 
became less of a priority when Washington reassured Manila in 1999 that their treaty covers 
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the South China Sea78 and a Visiting Forces Agreement would be implemented to allow a 
return of US Military presence in the Philippines at a non-permanent, but regular and 
rotational basis.  
Moreover, by August 2012, the country’s Department of National Defense presented to 
Congress its defense budget proposal for 2013, which it calls “one of the largest procurement 
plans ever for the armed forces of the Philippines.” The 2013 defense budget is 121.6 Billion 
pesos (approx. 3 Billion USD), which is 15 billion pesos (approx. 368 million USD) more 
than in 2012. The Defense Department also presented that under the 2013 budget, the 
Philippine Navy would be able to purchase two missile frigates from Italy armed with 
surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles and capable of targeting submarines.  
By October 2012, the amended law on Philippine Armed Forces modernization reached 
President Aquino’s desk. He described the acquisition plan as “the largest and most 
comprehensive upgrade program in the history of the country’s military.” What makes this 
significant is its speed, highlighting urgency. It could also mean that policymakers in Manila 
already accepted that the United States’ security commitment is no longer as certain as what 
it used to be.  
The first five years of the relaunched armed forces modernization program includes, among 
others, the purchase of 12 KAI T/A-50 lead-in fighter light-attack aircraft from South Korea, 
six Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucanos, 25 transport and 12 attack helicopters, four anti-
submarine multirole naval helicopters, and three special-mission long-range helicopters79. 
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Aside from military buildup, Manila is also beefing up its maritime defense postures. It is to 
be noted that the Philippine Coastguard vessels were forced to leave the Scarborough Shoal 
due to bad weather. The decision to leave the shoal effectively ended the standoff between 
Manila’s coastguard vessels and Beijing’s marine surveillance ships. The Philippines will buy 
five patrol boats from France for about 116 million USD80, “partly to guard disputed areas in 
the South China Sea.” The deal includes one 82-meter (271-foot) ship and four 24-meter (79-
foot) patrol crafts scheduled to be delivered by 2014. “When we patrol the West Philippine 
Sea, we encounter huge waves, turbulent waters so it will be better if we will use bigger 
ships,” Philippine Coast Guard Rear Admiral Luis Tuason said.  
By January 2013, the Philippines already got Japan’s official commitment for 10 brand new 
patrol vessels, including 1,000-ton ships to be financed through Japanese Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA).  
These rapid changes point to significant military build up and increased defense posture on 
the part of the Philippines. While these could be interpreted as directly a result of China’s 
aggressiveness highlighted by its success in effectively seizing control of the Scarborough 
Shoal, Washington’s ambiguous security commitments are leaving Manila with no choice but 
to pursue ambitious military upgrades by itself. Despite the existing mutual defense treaty 
with Washington, Manila’s aggressive military build up highlights alliance uncertainties.  
4.2 Diplomatic and security alliance building in the region 
 
The second most apparent implication of Japan-US and Philippines-US alliance uncertainties 
involved the two countries’ increased effort to build diplomatic and informal security 
alliances in the region. Japan being already considered as a great power had to reassert its 
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regional leadership. The Philippines on its part had to exercise leadership on a particular 
diplomatic niche in ASEAN – maritime security. These efforts could be seen as Tokyo and 
Manila’s way of diversifying their security hedge against the more aggressive Beijing, amidst 
their alliance uncertainties with Washington.  
 
Japan 
 
For almost half a century, Japan was viewed as the leading power in East Asia. 2010, the year 
when China surpassed the size of Japan’s economy, was significant because it could have 
signified the start of leadership transition in the region. Indeed, the 2010 Pinnacle Island 
incident could not have highlighted it better. The economic situation in East Asia was not the 
only aspect that changed but the security landscape as well. Japan’s failure to implement 
domestic laws against the captain of the Chinese trawler also signified China’s growing 
desire to alter regional status quos. Relevant to this paper is the United States’ positive 
response to what was being perceived as Tokyo’s diplomatic defeat. Washington apparently 
was more interested in deescalating the conflict rather than see its ally successfully trump 
Chinese pressures.  
 
The United States’ repeated mention of “taking no sides” in territorial disputes even if they 
involve treaty allies adds to Japan’s alliance uncertainties. As a result, Japan had been 
increasingly interested in linking security partnerships with other countries in the region and 
beyond, in one way or another. This is significant given Japan’s pacifist constitution. Tokyo’s 
increased interest in forging security cooperation agreements and dialogues with other 
governments, aside from Washington could be a way to gather support and establish a firmer 
stance against Beijing and fill in the gap that its alliance uncertainties with the US created.  
 
To further this claim, there were other various post-2010 Pinnacle Islands incident 
developments that point to significant alliance-building efforts by Japan.  
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In 2012, Japan released a $2 Million package for its military engineers to train Cambodian 
and East Timorese troops, the country’s first overseas military aid81. While such efforts could 
be viewed as civilian in nature, Japanese defense officials and analysts are expecting that 
Tokyo would soon begin providing defense hardwares like aircrafts and submarines82 to 
countries it wants to build stronger alliances with, in the form of direct sales, loans or 
overseas military/development assistance.  
 
More concretely, Japan has already strengthened its “strategic alliance” with the Philippines, 
another US-treaty ally and a neighbor with an equally serious China-related security problem. 
Japan’s commitment to provide coastguard vessels to the Philippines83 as well as the two 
countries cooperation on maritime issues underscore “alliance building.” Tokyo’s decision to 
provide Manila with 10 coastguard vessels through ODA is its largest security-related aid 
package yet. It is significant because of two reasons. One is the fact that Japanese ODAs are 
usually reserved for purely development endeavors such as roads, bridges and school 
buildings. This was a clear policy shift or expansion. Second is the fact that Manila is the 
most vocal ASEAN country to oppose China’s 9-dash line stance in the South China Sea.   
 
Japan has also pursued and/or engaged in multilateral military exercises, exchanges and/or 
maritime security-related cooperative efforts with Australia, India, South Korea, and 
Indonesia. All of these were largely absent in the decades and years prior to 2010, in which 
during those times, Japan’s only security engagement was with the United States. Keiro 
Kitagami, a special adviser on security issues to former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda had 
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an interesting take on the changing strategy of Japan. “During the cold war, all Japan had to 
do was follow the U.S. With China, it’s different. Japan has to take a stand on its own.”84 At 
the surface, the comment seemed to point to China being the single biggest reason why Japan 
has to stand on its own. However, another possible reason for this is its alliance uncertainties 
toward the United States. Washington may be more interested in safeguarding its economic 
interests that are closely linked to China, rather than militarily defend Japan’s questionable 
sovereignty over the Pinnacle Islands, on which it takes no stand.   
Yoshihide Soeya of the Institute of East Asian Studies at Keio University in Tokyo view 
Japan’s effort in building alliances in the region as a means to prevent China from dictating 
regional order. “We want to build our own coalition of the willing in Asia to prevent China 
from just running over us,”85 he said.  
Another sign of Japan’s diplomatic and security alliance building efforts include its decision 
to host a special summit with ASEAN members in 201386 aimed at establishing stronger 
maritime security cooperation. This would particularly interest countries with China-related 
maritime issues such as the Philippines and Vietnam. This decision was announced during the 
Japan-ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting at the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in 
Cambodia in 2012.  
With all these, it cannot be discounted that the United States’ very limited responses to 
China’s aggressiveness are pushing Japan to build other alliances in the region.  
 
                                                          
84 Fackler, Martin. "Japan Is Flexing Its Military Muscle to Counter a Rising China." CNBC.com. The New York Times, 28 Nov. 
2012. Web. 11 Dec. 2012. 
<http://www.cnbc.com/id/50002955/Japan_Is_Flexing_Its_Military_Muscle_to_Counter_a_Rising_China>. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Bower, Ernest Z. "Southeast Asia from the Corner of 18th and K Streets: China Reveals Its Hand on ASEAN in Phnom 
Penh." Center for Strategic and International Studies. CISS, 19 July 2012. Web. 22 July 2012. 
<http://csis.org/publication/southeast-asia-corner-18th-and-k-streets-china-reveals-its-hand-asean-phnom-penh>. 
39 
 
 
Philippines 
 
The Philippines for its part has to build other alliances in order to diversify its security hedge 
taking into account the uncertain security commitment of the United States. On July 24, 2012, 
the Philippine Senate approved the ratification of the Status Visiting Forces Agreement 
(SOVFA) between Philippine and Australian militaries. This agreement is the first obvious 
alliance building effort on the part of Manila as a result of its alliance uncertainties toward the 
US. This is significant because its ratification had been delayed for five years and only after 
the Scarborough Shoal incident was it viewed as urgent and necessary. In his vote, Senate 
President Juan Ponce-Enrile said that even during the Second World War when he was 
serving in the guerilla movement, he found Australia to be a more reliable ally than the 
United States87. The statement of the Philippines’ Senate President was noteworthy. It further 
cemented the idea that the sudden approval of the Philippines-Australia defense pact was a 
result of Manila’s alliance uncertainties toward Washington.  
 
Furthermore, the Philippines also upgraded its “strategic relationship” with Japan into 
“strategic alliance” involving issues that go beyond development, trade and economics. The 
Philippines and Japan complemented each other well on their China-related security issues by 
establishing close cooperation in the field of maritime security. In order to reciprocate 
Tokyo’s commitment of helping it upgrade its maritime security hardwares, Manila willingly 
announced to international media its support for the “rearming of Japan”88 which refers to the 
revision of its pacifist constitution.  
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Likewise, the Philippines also intends to continue its close cooperation with Vietnam89, a 
fellow ASEAN claimant country in the South China Sea.  
 
The Philippines also exercised diplomatic leadership in the region by initiating a meeting 
with all ASEAN-claimant countries in South China Sea to discuss a common front against 
China90.  
 
4.3 Role of multilateralism and international legal institutions 
 
The third implication of the two countries’ alliance uncertainties toward the US that this 
paper attempted to identify is related to their reliance on multilateralism and legal institutions. 
While the two previous policy implications identified above were common to both Tokyo and 
Manila, they seem to deviate on how they view the role of multilateral security and legal 
institutions. Multilateral security institutions here refer to international institutions that 
discuss or involve security matters, such as the UN, East Asia Forum and ASEAN Related 
Summits. Multilateral legal institutions here refer to the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) with its attached International Tribunal on the Law the Seas 
(ITLOS) and the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, as well as the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ).  
 
Japan  
Since the Pinnacle Islands are under the administration of Japan, Tokyo is unwilling to 
submit to any international arbitration91 that may compromise the credibility of its claimed 
sovereignty over those islands and the water surrounding them. Tokyo out rightly rejected 
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any attempt to involve the International Court of Justice in resolving its dispute with China92. 
While Beijing is not dismissive of the role of the ICJ in settling the Pinnacle Islands dispute, 
Tokyo’s outright dismissal of any international arbitration is expected. Tokyo is in control of 
the islands and efforts to involve international arbitration compromise its national interests. 
Moreover, Japan is also arguably still a major regional power. Even though the security 
commitments of the United States contain doubts and uncertainties, Japan is more concerned 
on keeping the status quo on the Pinnacle Islands by preventing China from carrying out any 
revisionist behavior through other means not involving legal arbitration. Moreover, China 
seems to be selectively embracing multilateral security and legal institutions in an attempt to 
decrease the credibility of Japan’s control over the Pinnacle Islands and surrounding waters. 
By December 2012, Beijing submitted to the United Nations its official claim that China’s 
continental shelf limit is the Okinawa Trough, effectively covering the Pinnacle Islands as 
part of the Chinese territory93. Under UNCLOS, a country can extend its 200-nautical-mile 
exclusive economic zone if it has geological and scientifically accepted proof that an adjacent 
continental shelf is a natural prolongation of its main land mass. This was a significant 
development. Should the United Nations, through its Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf decide in favor of Beijing, Japan could lose its credibility in maintaining 
control of the islands, not to mention that it could provide a legal footing for the Chinese 
Government to do everything it could to reverse the status quo on the Pinnacle Islands, by 
peaceful means or otherwise. In a letter to the commission, Japan argued that China’s 
submission should not be considered 94 . However, as of this writing, the UN already 
expressed its desire to tackle China’s submission within the year (2013). Tokyo expressed its 
disagreement saying that the UN should not be involved. With all these, Tokyo’s alliance 
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uncertainties toward Washington does not seem to affect how it views the role of multilateral 
and legal institutions in resolving the Pinnacle Islands issue. 
Philippines 
 
The Philippines’ resulting alliance uncertainties toward Washington that were highlighted by 
Beijing’s successful revision of the status quo in the Scarborough Shoal increased Manila’s 
reliance on multilateralism and international legal institutions. Beijing’s continued occupation 
of the Scarborough Shoal and Manila’s diplomatic defeat in 2012 did not merit considerable 
attention or alarm from the United States. The Philippines’ desire to de-escalate tension could 
be the most logical reason why it opted not to send back patrol ships to the Scarborough 
Shoal. Despite negotiations with China, Beijing did not leave the shoal. Manila’s failures to 
get a consensus backing from ASEAN and a stronger reassurance from its treaty ally, the 
United States left it with very little choice but to rely on established international legal 
institutions while continuously exhausting multilateralism. The Philippines, in January 2013, 
formally brought all its South China Sea disputes (Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands) 
before an arbitral tribunal established under UNCLOS 95 . Both Beijing and Manila are 
signatories to the said sea convention. Such a move was significant in a sense that it does not 
require Beijing’s active participation to the arbitration for the proceedings to occur and for an 
“award” to be rendered. Completely a reverse of China’s position on the Pinnacle Islands, it 
does not want to involve international legal institutions in tackling its South China Sea 
disputes with the Philippines and other ASEAN countries. China prefers to negotiate with the 
Philippines bilaterally. Manila expects, based on previous cases, a decision on the matter in 
three to four years. Although not binding, should the UN tribunal decides to invalidate the 9-
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dash line map claim of Beijing, it would erode significantly China’s credibility and could 
provide the Philippines and other ASEAN claimant countries strong moral and legal grounds. 
Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert Del Rosario said that Manila “has exhausted 
almost all political and diplomatic avenues for a peaceful negotiated settlement of its 
maritime dispute with China.” 96  It could be inferred that despite the Philippines close 
coordination with the US, including its two-on-two bilateral engagements, Manila’s failure to 
secure stronger and clearer security commitments from the United States related to its South 
China Sea disputes pushed it to risk an economic backlash from China and unilaterally take 
the world’s second largest economy into an international arbitrary proceedings.  
 
Meanwhile, the Philippines has shown persistent pattern of bringing up its dispute with China 
to international summits, such as ASEAN, ASEAN Related Summits, and UN General 
Assembly, highlighting multilateralism. Moreover, it has continuously asked major countries 
(Germany, UK, Australia) to back its stance of resolving its dispute with China by peaceful 
means particularly through international law. China opposes the internationalization of its 
disputes with the Philippines. In all of these, the United States seemed to be more concerned 
about staying out of the dispute as much as possible.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The rise of China and the accompanying increased aggressiveness of Beijing’s assertion on 
its various territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas highlighted the 
inherent “credibility problem” of the Japan-US and the Philippines-US alliances. Both the 
Pinnacle Islands incident in 2010, including the succeeding tensions, and the Scarborough 
Shoal incident in 2012 underscored the United States’ ambiguous security commitments to its 
treaty allies in the Pacific, despite Washington’s much hyped “pivot to Asia” strategy. The 
United States’ perceived greater national interests in preventing a war with China may be the 
most obvious reason for Washington’s ambiguity in supporting its allies. This has caused 
Japan and the Philippines to develop “alliance uncertainties” resulting to two common policy 
implications, as observed: 1) significant military build-up and increased defense posture; and 
2) significant alliance building efforts in the region. These two policy actions are geared 
toward filling up the gap that their alliance uncertainties toward Washington have created. 
For the Philippines, it went on further to increase its reliance on multilateralism and 
international legal institutions. For Japan, while multilateralism remains on the table, it views 
international legal institutions as too compromising for its national interest of maintaining 
control over the Pinnacle Islands. The deviation could be a result of the two countries 
difference in national power. On the one hand, the Philippines’ weak defenses could not be 
transformed overnight and so it has to emphasize international law to thwart future Chinese 
revisionist actions. On the other hand, Japan remains a major regional power able to project 
military might and international influence that, despite its uncertainties toward US security 
commitments, still enough to counter China.  
 
The Japan-US and the Philippines-US alliances are very different from NATO. Both treaties 
do not necessarily require immediate US military intervention adding to uncertainties. Unlike 
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in the Cold War when the US could immediately commit to defend its allies against Soviet 
aggression, China is different. The United States continues to emphasize the engagement of 
China. The United States’ economic interests in maintaining a harmonious relationship with 
China could also be huge factor that give both Japan and the Philippines considerable 
uncertainties on Washington’s alliance commitments. It remains questionable whether the 
United States could afford to fire on Chinese ships and aircrafts in defense of its allies’ 
control of small rocks and islands risking huge economic and geopolitical ramifications.  
 
The responses of Japan and the Philippines were but expected. Countries that feel threatened 
by a more powerful neighbor would usually resort to balancing through alliance building97, as 
well as through military build up98 and increased defense postures. Moreover, both countries 
are keen on pushing for their national interests regardless of established governing 
international legal institutions. Japan’s choice to dismiss any role that international legal 
institutions (e.g. UNCLOS) or arbitration bodies (ICJ) in dealing with the Pinnacle Islands 
dispute, and the Philippines’ full embrace of international legal institutions were also not 
unusual. Apparently, the role of multilateral legal and security institutions depend on how 
states perceive them vis-à-vis their national interests. The utility of international legal 
institutions established to govern states is dependent on whether particular states view them 
as threatening or supporting to their national interests99.  
 
While this paper does not discount that China’s increased aggressiveness on its territorial and 
maritime claims in the Pacific since 2010 remains to be the most obvious reason for those 
two policy actions by Japan and the Philippines, this paper contends that their alliance 
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uncertainties toward the United States left them with little choice but to find alternative 
security hedge and aggression-deterrence factors against the rising China.  
 
The justifications behind the behaviors or policy actions of Japan and the Philippines in 
response to their alliance uncertainties toward the United States, in relation to their separate 
territorial and maritime disputes with a more assertive China presented in this paper are of 
course very simplified. There must have been other factors that could have influenced the 
sudden military buildup, increased defense postures, heightened regional alliance building 
efforts and deviation in viewing the role of multilateralism and international legal institutions 
on the part of Tokyo and Manila that were not included here. However, this paper does not 
seek to explain everything. The arguments presented and explained might be too basic. 
Nevertheless, they could provide insights into the current struggles of the Philippines and 
Japan, two countries of varying levels of national power, in countering a more assertive 
China, taking into consideration a rapidly changing regional geopolitical and security 
landscape.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY 
BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan, 
 
Desiring to foster international peace and security, within the framework of the Charter of the 
United Nations, through voluntary arrangements which will further the ability of nations 
dedicated to the purposes and principles of the Charter to develop effective measures for 
individual and collective self-defense in support of those purposes and principles; 
 
Reaffirming their belief as stated in the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San 
Francisco on September 8, 1951 that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations; 
 
Recalling the preamble of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and 
Japan, signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, to the effect that the United 
States of America, in the interest of peace and security, would maintain certain of its armed 
forces in and about Japan as a provisional arrangement in the expectation that Japan will 
itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect 
aggression, always avoiding armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than 
to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles or the Charter 
of the United Nations; 
 
Recognizing that, in the planning of a defense assistance program for Japan, economic 
stability will be an essential element for consideration in the development of its defense 
capacities, and that Japan can contribute only to the extent permitted by its general economic 
condition and capacities; 
 
Taking into consideration the support that the Government of the United States of America 
has brought to these principles by enacting the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of l949, as 
amended, and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, which provide for the furnishing 
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of defense assistance by the United States of America in furtherance of the objectives referred 
to above; and 
 
Desiring to set forth the conditions, which will govern the furnishing of such assistance; 
 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
ARTICLE I 
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any 
international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner 
that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of 
the United Nations. The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to 
strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and 
security may be discharged more effectively. 
 
ARTICLE II 
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly 
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better 
understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting 
conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their 
international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them. 
ARTICLE III 
The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and 
effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional 
provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack. 
 
ARTICLE IV 
The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this 
Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international 
peace and security in the Far East is threatened. 
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ARTICLE V 
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the 
administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it 
would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and 
processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and 
security. 
 
ARTICLE VI 
For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international 
peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, 
air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as 
well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate 
agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty 
between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as 
amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon. 
 
ARTICLE VII 
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and 
obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the 
United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
 
ARTICLE VIII 
This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with 
their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the 
instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo. 
 
ARTICLE IX 
The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at the city of San 
Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty. 
 
58 
 
ARTICLE X 
This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the 
United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements 
as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the 
Japan area. However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give 
notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall 
terminate one year after such notice has been given. 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. 
DONE in duplicate at Washington in the Japanese and English languages, both equally 
authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960. 
FOR JAPAN: 
 
Nobusuke Kishi 
 
Aiichiro Fujiyama 
 
Mitsujiro Ishii 
 
Tadashi Adachi 
 
Koichiro Asakai 
 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
 
Christian A. Herter 
 
Douglas MacArthur 2nd 
 
J. Graham Parsons 
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APPENDIX II 
 
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY 
Between the 
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
The Parties of this Treaty 
 
Reaffirming their faith in the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and 
their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen 
the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.  
 
Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship, which brought their two peoples 
together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against 
imperialist aggression during the last war.  
 
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common 
determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential 
aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area.  
 
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation 
of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional 
security in the Pacific area.  
 
Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in any 
way or sense altering or diminishing any existing agreements or understandings between the 
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America.  
 
Have agreed as follows:  
 
ARTICLE I. The parties undertake as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle 
any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in 
their international relation from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.  
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ARTICLE II. In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties 
separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual 
and collective capacity to resist armed attack.  
 
ARTICLE III. The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult 
together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the 
opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either 
of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific.  
 
ARTICLE IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the 
Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet 
the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.  
 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated 
when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain 
international peace and security.  
 
ARTICLE V. For purposes of ARTICLE IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is 
deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on 
the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its armed forces, public 
vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.  
 
ARTICLE VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way 
the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the 
responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.  
 
ARTICLE VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of the Philippines and the United 
States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come 
into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Manila.  
 
ARTICLE VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it 
one year after notice has been given to the other party.  
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In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. 
 
Done in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August, 1951. 
 
For the Republic of the Philippines: 
 
(Sgd.) CARLOS P. ROMULO  
(Sgd.) JOAQUIN M. ELIZALDE  
(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO  
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL  
  
For the United States of America: 
 
(Sgd.) DEAN ACHESON  
(Sgd.) JOHN FOSTER DULLES  
(Sgd.) TOM CONNALLY  
(Sgd.) ALEXANDER WILEY  
 
 
